ADR-0119
ADR-0119-three-levels-of-proof-and-one-required-level-each-row-says-whether-its-evidence-is-re-derived-attested-or-declared.md
ADR-0119 — Three levels of proof and one required level: each row says whether its evidence is re-derived by runward, attested or declared, and --require refuses below the level asked
Date: 2026-11-05
Status: accepted (2026-11-05). Constitutional, class R under ADR-0088 decision 2: it adds a term to the
verdict and reopens ADR-0060
Deciders: the maintainer, by delegation in chat on 2026-11-05, in these words (translated from
French): « runward must perhaps cover more than what we imagined. Everything has evolved. » and « In what
I have to do there are items that you can do, and where you even make recommendations to me. After having
investigated. So I trust you: carry it out each time instead of asking me. » Accepted on the
recommendation of the agent sessions that investigated (scratchpad inv-S1, inv-S2); the maintainer did not
review this text before acceptance. This is a delegation, not a review. The words were relayed to the
session that wrote this record by the session that received them. Under ADR-0088 decision 4 the
maintainer is the single accountable person, and the agent's writing is disclosed throughput, not
independent review; as ADR-0088 decision 3 asks, the act is recorded by an agent session (agent), for
github:stranxik (accountable). The delegation does not amend runward/delegation.md, where class R stays
the maintainer's and scope-D covers non-constitutional ADRs only: this acceptance stands outside the
charter, and the record lands when the maintainer approves its pull request
Method: read on a fresh clone of stranxik/runward at main@61d5041: src/lib/verdict.ts
(computeVerdict, verdictFrom), src/lib/check-contract.ts (machinePayload, nextStep),
src/lib/attestation.ts, docs/spec/runward-signing.md (§3, signatureVerified), ADR-0047, 0055, 0060,
0069, 0073, 0083, 0089, 0093, 0095, 0098. The flag of ADR-0114 as written on branch
fix/symbols-outside-comments-and-vacuous-green, which was not on GitHub on 2026-11-05 and was read in its
working copy: --require <level> with the levels traced and mechanical, ordered « so a later level
slots in by rank », mechanical the default of a full strict verdict, exit 5 when no gap stands and the
level is not met, verdict.require = { level, met }, and verdictOutcome, the one reading of the words
and the code. The sabotage measurements are ADR-0117's
Relates to: ADR-0117
(the perimeter this record grades), ADR-0120
(where attested evidence comes from), ADR-0114 (the flag this record extends; in progress), ADR-0118 (the
analyzers that make re-derived reach code; in progress), ADR-0113 (verify says verified only for what
it re-derives; in progress)
Amends, by name: ADR-0060, reopened in the
form it wrote; ADR-0047, a term added to
the verdict; ADR-0095,
the machine surfaces. Each receives its dated note with the code, one delivery ahead of it (ADR-0093's
practice); no accepted decision is rewritten
Context
ADR-0060 wrote the shape of its own reversal. It kept a vacuous green green, disclosed, and added:
« If this ever becomes a refusal, it takes Jest's shape: a named opt-in flag, never a silent pass. »
ADR-0114 takes that step for one case: check --strict --require <level>, where mechanical (at least
one applied row carries a pointer the gate opened and checked) is the default of a full strict verdict and
traced accepts by name a green that rests on judgement alone; a run with no gap that does not meet its
level exits 5.
What a reader cannot tell, measured on 2026-11-05. Whether a row's evidence was recomputed by runward,
produced by something the agent could not reach, or written by the agent. evidence.typed counts the
pointers the gate opened; nothing records where the opened thing came from. A committed report is read as
it was committed (ADR-0098: freshness is not verified by check), and a hand-committed 93-byte ESLint JSON
satisfies requires:. The exit code and the last line are the same for the healthy mission and for each
sabotage of ADR-0117's table.
What ADR-0117 needs. Three objects at three named levels, and a way for a pipeline to ask for a level and be refused below it.
What the CLI may say about a signature. Nothing it has checked: it never signs and never verifies a
signature (ADR-0093; docs/spec/runward-signing.md freezes signatureVerified: false). A level that
depends on a signature must say which checks the CLI made.
Decision
1. Three levels, for each piece of evidence an applied row cites.
re-derived: runward recomputes the fact from the tree, offline and deterministically. A pointer that resolves; a cited symbol present outside comments (ADR-0114); a sealed digest; an ADR that resolves; an analyzer's reading of the declared territory (ADR-0118). These are the static pieces. What a reader must trust: the tree and runward's version.attested: a fact runward cannot recompute, because it takes an execution: a test result, coverage of the cited lines, a mutation result on the cited lines, an eval, the report arequires:nature names. These are the execution pieces. An execution piece is attested when it was produced outside the agent's reach (ADR-0120) and passes three checks. Two are made by the CLI: the binding (the report's digest is a subject of a run Statement found in the tree, and the source digests that Statement records match the tree) and the presence of a signature on that Statement (counted, asverifyalready counts DSSE signatures, never verified). The third, the identity, is never checked by the CLI: the signature verifies against the operator's trust policy, inrunward-fleetor in the operator's CI. What a reader must trust: also that identity and its executor.declared: a piece that rests on what someone wrote. A prose pointer; an execution report no attestation binds (ADR-0073 option 1 as shipped, a report the agent's own session produced); a run Statement that carries no signature.
What is not graded. The decision itself, an n/a or deviated answer and its reason, and a
ratification are what the accountable people declared: the reference the verdict measures against, not
evidence a level grades. A ratification trace stays declared provenance (the last sentence of
GATE_NON_SCOPE), and no level depends on it, so a mission that ratifies every row (ADR-0080 part 1)
reaches every level its evidence reaches.
A level qualifies how a fact was established, never whether it is true: a file: pointer to a document
re-derives that the document exists and resolves, not what it says.
A row's level, for each applied row: declared when it rests on a static piece runward could not
re-derive (a prose pointer); otherwise attested when it cites at least one execution piece and every
execution piece it cites is attested; otherwise re-derived, and each execution piece it cites that is
not attested is named beside it (« execution: declared »). This is ADR-0114's reading, refined: ADR-0114
reads a row listed in evidence.proseRows as declared and every other applied row as re-derived.
2. One required level, on a ladder that extends ADR-0114 by rank: traced < mechanical <
re-derived < attested. Each level includes the one below it.
tracedandmechanical: ADR-0114's, unchanged. ADR-0114 left one question to this record, whethermechanicalstays « one row » or becomes a floor every row must reach. It stays one row: the floor every applied row must reach is a level of its own,re-derived, so no run that metmechanicalunder that name is refused under it later.re-derived: no applied row readsdeclared; and the declared territory is non-empty and analysed under the declared policy (ADR-0118), in languages the analyzers read. Execution pieces may still be unattested; each one is named.attested:re-derived, and no applied row cites an execution piece that is not attested, and everyrequires:nature an applied row rests on is met by an attested report. A row that cites no execution piece meets it atre-derived, since an attestation adds nothing to a fact runward recomputes. Where a row cites a code location and a test, andrunward-runhas a mutator for the language, the mutation fact of ADR-0120 is part of its execution evidence: the row is belowattestedwhen its cited tests kill no mutant of its cited lines through a failed assertion. Where the runner cannot tell a failed assertion from an error, the row is held to « at least one mutant of its cited lines killed », and every surface says the distinction was unavailable. Where no mutator exists for the language, the row reachesattestedwithout the mutation fact, and every surface says so.
An attested row does not rank above a re-derived one because an attestation beats a re-derivation: as evidence, an attested fact asks a reader to trust more (an identity and its executor). It ranks above because it leaves nothing to the agent's word: its static pieces are re-derived, and its execution pieces were produced out of the agent's reach.
3. --require <level>, ADR-0114's flag, takes the four values. A run with no gap that is below the
level it requires exits 5 (ADR-0114's code), names each row below the level and the piece that holds it
there, and --freeze refuses to seal it (ADR-0114). A gap stays exit 1 whatever the level; an unknown
level is a misuse, exit 2 (ADR-0083).
4. Where the required level comes from, and the defaults. For a full strict verdict: the flag, else
the mission's lock ("requiredLevel" in runward/scaffold-lock.json: a lock opt-in, so a class R act
under ADR-0088 decision 2, and on runward's own mission a change to a pre-merge path), else ADR-0114's
default, mechanical. A --through prefix requires traced unless the flag names a level: the lock never
applies to a prefix, because a declared horizon speaks for progress, never for a crossing (ADR-0053,
ADR-0114).
- New missions.
runward initwrites"requiredLevel": "re-derived"from the first release that both ships ADR-0118's analyzers and meets ADR-0117's criterion 2 (false reds measured on real repositories), as ADR-0069 made the structure contract the default for new missions. A new mission that is documentation only lowers it by name, in a diff a reviewer reads. - No mission is refused for its language. A
re-derivedthe lock asks for applies to the languages the analyzers read: when the declared territory holds files in a language they do not read, the run requiresmechanicalinstead and says so on every surface, naming the language (« re-derived: not reachable, is not analysed; this run requires mechanical »). Only--require re-derived, asked by name, refuses a territory in a language no analyzer reads. The same holds for the static half of anattestedthe lock or the regulated tier asks for. The level a run meets is never overstated: such a run meetsmechanical, notre-derived. - Existing missions. No verdict moves:
updatepreserves the lock as it is, and every strict run prints the level the mission meets and the rows the next level would refuse. - The regulated tier (ADR-0080) requires
attestedfrom one minor release after bothrunward-runand the verification half of D4 (ADR-0120) are published, with a migration notice in the release before it. - Never a default for an unregulated mission:
attested. It depends on infrastructure the operator runs (an executor in CI, a verifier), and ADR-0093 decision 1 keeps every function of the CLI working without a third-party tool. - runward's own mission takes
re-derivedin the release that makes it the default for new missions, which means declaring the territory its analyzers read, or that release's CHANGELOG entry says why not. The product does not ask of others what it declines to do (ADR-0073). - The shipped example meets
re-derivedin that same release: on 2026-11-05, 22 of its 24 applied rows carry a typed pointer and 2 are prose (measured withinit --example), so those two become typed pointers first.
5. What the CLI alone can refuse at attested, and what it cannot. check re-derives the binding,
counts the signatures, and prints, at the character, « attested: the binding is re-derived by this
command; the signature is verified outside it ». Every payload the CLI writes carries
signatureVerified: false. On its own, the CLI refuses an unbound report, an unsigned Statement and a
mutation fact with no kill; it does not refuse a Statement a forger signed with a key of their own, which
only the identity check refuses. A pipeline that admits on attested therefore runs both, in a job the
agent cannot change (ADR-0120 gives the layout), and the CLI never presents a piece as attested in full.
6. The machine surfaces, additive (ADR-0095's rule).
- Each applied row of
conformance[]incheck --jsoncarriesproof: { level, pieces: [{ pointer, kind: "static" | "execution", level, setsLevel }] }; a row that is not applied carries none. - The strict block carries
levels: { required, source: "flag" | "lock" | "default", met, rows: { "re-derived": [...], "attested": [...], "declared": [...] } }, each count with its list (ADR-0095 decision 2, ADR-0093 rule R1). ADR-0114'srequirekey keeps its shape. verifyre-derives each new field on its own, only when present (ADR-0095), and says verified only for what it re-derives (ADR-0113).- The attestation predicate carries the level met. The VSA's
verificationResultreadsPASSEDonly on exit 0 (ADR-0114), and the level met travels as one more customverifiedLevelsvalue, never anSLSA_one (ADR-0055, amendment of 2026-08-17). - The witness lists the levels under
notWitnesseduntil its checker re-derives them (ADR-0089, increment 2). - The text output, the SARIF properties and the delivery report name each row's level. No surface sums levels into a percentage (ADR-0093's view rules).
7. ADR-0047: the term is computed where a test reaches it. The levels are computed in the library
(src/lib/verdict.ts and the evidence modules) and read by every surface through ADR-0114's
verdictOutcome; check.ts decides nothing. This is a change that adds a term to the verdict, which is
ADR-0047's own trigger, and each piece of the term is pinned in both directions.
8. ADR-0060, reopened in the form it wrote. The refusal takes Jest's shape, a named flag, and its
values extend by rank; no level becomes a silent pass, and traced stays the named way to accept a green
that rests on judgement alone. ADR-0060's disclosure stays on every mission.
Alternatives discarded
- One word for the whole run, no level per row. A count that travels without its list (ADR-0095): a reader would know the run is below its level and not which row holds it there.
attestedas the default of every mission. It needs an executor and a verifier the operator runs; every upgrade would turn red on missions that have neither (ADR-0093 decision 1).re-derivedat the top of the ladder, every row recomputable by runward. The CLI runs nothing, so every execution claim would be refused: a top level no software mission can reach.- One exit code per level. One meaning per code (ADR-0083); exit 5 already says « no gap, the level is not met » (ADR-0114), and the level is named in the output and the payload.
- The CLI verifies the signature itself. ADR-0093 decided it never does: a trust root and a
cryptographic dependency would enter the verdict path, and a signature is checked where the trust policy
lives. Counting signatures is not verifying them, and
verifyalready counts them. - Grade the ratification and the decision too. A ratification is declared by nature, so every row of a
regulated mission (ADR-0080 part 1) would read
declaredandattestedcould never be met; and the decision is the reference the verdict measures against, not evidence of the delivery. attestedread from the report's own statement of provenance (a property written into the report). The writer would declare its own independence, the defect ADR-0098 named in its option C.- A percentage of re-derived rows as the level. ADR-0093's view rules forbid a composite percentage, and ADR-0046 refuses a score as a crossing condition.
Consequences
- Positive. At the level it requires, the exit code and the last line now differ between the healthy
mission and a sabotaged one. A reader sees, row by row, what rests on the agent's word. ADR-0060's
disclosure becomes a refusal by name, and the reading an enterprise pipeline needs has a name,
attested. - Negative, accepted. A larger payload; one more lock opt-in, a class R act; existing missions see one
more line until they opt in; a mission whose territory holds a language no analyzer reads runs at
mechanicalunder a lock that asks forre-derived, and says so; a row in a language with no mutator meetsattestedwithout the mutation fact and says so; three more fieldsverifymust keep re-deriving. - On other boundaries. No crossing of ADR-0054 is touched: every level is computed from the tree, and the identity check stays outside the CLI. ADR-0090's assurance modes are untouched: a mode says who controls the acts, a level says where the evidence came from.
- Nothing ships with this record. The levels land with ADR-0114's flag, ADR-0118's analyzers and ADR-0120's executor, each in its own pull request on the charter's pre-merge paths.
What this does not catch
- A test written to defeat the executor: one that reads the code under test as bytes, or prints
results it did not compute.
attestedsays the pinned executor produced the report from this tree, not that the agent's code behaved while it ran; ADR-0118's test-integrity family is where such tests are named. - A weak assertion, one that kills a mutant of the cited lines and misses the others. The survivors are listed, never summed; the reader judges.
- A wrong requirement with green tests, prose, intent, and who ratified.
- A signature from an identity the trust policy should not have trusted. The policy is the operator's.
What would settle it
For:
- On the sabotage table of ADR-0117, replayed with the release that ships this record and ADR-0118, on
the shipped example as that release ships it (its two prose rows typed):
--require re-derivedexits non-zero on rows 1 to 7 (5 when the level is the only failure, 1 when a gap stands) and 0 on the two controls;--require attested, withrunward-run's reports bound to the tree and signed, exits 5 on row 8 and names the row and its mutation fact, and exits 0 on the controls. - A hand-committed 93-byte ESLint JSON, a forged one-case JUnit report and an unsigned Statement the agent
wrote, consistent with the tree, each read
declaredand exit 5 atattested. A Statement the agent signs with a key of its own readsattestedin the CLI, withsignatureVerified: false, and is refused by the identity check (ADR-0120, D4a). - A regulated mission whose every row is ratified reaches
attestedwhen its evidence does (the ratification is not graded), measured on a fixture. - A mission whose territory holds a file in a language no analyzer reads, under a lock asking for
re-derived, exits 0 atmechanicalwith the line that names the language; under--require re-derivedit exits 5. - On every fixture of the attack corpus, each row's level equals the level of its least independent piece,
and a planted mismatch reddens a unit test; every count travels with its list;
check --strict --jsonis byte-identical across two runs on an unchanged tree; the new fields make no attestation written by 0.46.0 fail on an unchanged tree (ADR-0095's additive rule). - The « attested: ... » sentence is printed at the character wherever
attestedis read, andsignatureVerifiedisfalsein every payload the CLI writes, both pinned by tests.
Against: on the real repositories of ADR-0117's criterion 2, an honest mission that must type pointers
by hand or lower its level on more than half of its applied rows to reach re-derived (the ladder is
drawn in the wrong place); one report, issue or assessor's reading that takes the CLI's attested for a
verified signature despite the sentence; one consumer found branching on a row's level as if it were the
verdict.
Reevaluation trigger (mandatory, dated)
Reopen on 2027-02-05, or earlier when: ADR-0114 merges with another shape for --require (this record
then follows its names and keeps the ranks); the first adopter requires attested in CI; a false red at
re-derived on a real repository; the verification half of D4 ships, which raises the question whether
its result may enter a file the CLI reads, a question this record leaves closed under ADR-0093.
Trigger set on: 2026-11-05 · Watched via: the attack corpus with the sabotage table, the payload
golden tests and check-contract's tests, and the published classification of findings on real
repositories (ADR-0117, criterion 2).
Note, 2026-11-06: re-derived and attested land with ADR-0120's R1, in part
check --strict --require takes the four values of decision 2, by rank (src/lib/evidence-levels.ts,
read by verdictOutcome as ADR-0114's levels are). Delivered: each applied row's level and its pieces
(decision 1), re-derived (no declared row, the declared territory analysed under the pinned policy,
a language the analyzers do not read named and refused under the flag) and attested (also, every
execution piece bound to the tree by a signed run Statement, and every requires: nature carried by an
attested report); exit 5 below the level, naming each row and what holds it (decision 3); the CLI's
two checks of decision 5, the binding re-derived and the signatures counted, the sentence at the
character on the terminal and in the payload, signatureVerified: false; the levels block of
check --json, present only when the run requires re-derived or attested, so every other payload
keeps its bytes (decision 6, additive), re-derived by verify with the rest of the payload. Each row's
proof travels in levels.rows rather than on conformance[], which lists only refused rows.
Not delivered, each to land in its own change: the required level read from the mission's lock and the
language fallback under it (decision 4), so source is flag in every payload today; init writing
"requiredLevel" for new missions; the level printed on every strict run whatever it requires; the SARIF
properties, the delivery report and the witness naming each row's level (decision 6); a verifiedLevels
value of the VSA. The shipped example still answers one row in prose (topology-usage-registry-present
cites its own manifest), which re-derived refuses: the laboratory of ADR-0120's tests types it, the
example does not yet. The mutation fact of decision 2 waits for ADR-0120's R2: until then every surface
says that no run Statement bound here carries a mutation leg.
Note, 2026-11-06 (later): the lock, the fallback and the surfaces of decisions 4 and 6
Delivered on a second branch, each piece pinned by test/unit/levels-lock.test.js:
- The lock (decision 4). A full strict verdict reads
"requiredLevel"inrunward/scaffold-lock.jsonwhen--requirenames none (lockRequiredLevel,requiredLevel(opts, lock)insrc/lib/verdict.ts); a--throughprefix never reads it; a value that is not a level is refused before the gate runs, exit 2 (ADR-0083), the flag included, so a typo never reads as a weaker level.levels.sourceislock.updatecarries the line through as written, a refused value included, and writes none on its own: the writer rebuilds the lock, and RWD-2026-0106 is what happened when a lock opt-in was not one of its parameters. - The fallback (decision 4). A
re-derivedthe lock asks for, on a territory holding a language the analyzers do not read, requiresmechanical(require.level), says so at the character inlevels.fallbackand on every surface, andlevels.belowthen names only what holds the run, a declared row staying listed underrows.declared. For anattestedthe lock asks for, the static half falls and the name is kept; the sentence adds « for its static half, and attested for its execution ». Asked by name,--require re-derivedstill refuses the territory. Measured oninit --examplewithcode/tools/convert.pyadded: exit 0 under the lock,require: { level: "mechanical", met: true }, exit 5 under the flag. - Every strict run prints the level the tree meets and what the next level would refuse, read at
attestedfor the terminal only, so the payload, the renderings and the exit code of a run that asks for no upper level keep their bytes. Oninit --example: « level of proof this tree meets: mechanical; the next level, re-derived, would refuse 1 row(s) that rest on a declaration ». On runward's own mission: mechanical; re-derived would refuse 1 row that rests on a declaration, and the mission pins no analysis policy. - The surfaces (decision 6), each only when the run reads the levels: the SARIF run's property bag
(
levels, each applied row named under its level), the witness (alevelsmember, and the familylevelsundernotWitnessedin that witness alone,docs/spec/witness.md7.8), the delivery report and the job summary (a table of each applied row at its level, and what holds it below), and the VSA (one moreverifiedLevelsvalue naming the level met, never overstated:RUNWARD_PROOF_RE_DERIVED,RUNWARD_PROOF_ATTESTED, orRUNWARD_PROOF_MECHANICALunder the fallback, by the ladder of decision 2). The attestation predicate already carried the level throughrequireandlevels.statusnames the level the lock asks for.gate-hooknamesmechanical: the session gate's question is gaps (ADR-0065), and anattestedlevel needs a run the session cannot make (ADR-0120).
Not delivered, and why. init still writes no level: this decision moves the default of new missions
in the first release that meets ADR-0117's criterion 2, and no classification of false reds on three real
repositories is published. The switch is one constant, NEW_MISSION_REQUIRED_LEVEL in
src/lib/evidence-levels.ts, read by init; the release that flips it also types the shipped example's
prose row (topology-usage-registry-present), takes re-derived on runward's own mission or says why not
in its CHANGELOG entry (the mission pins no analysis policy today, and its lock is a pre-merge path), and
regenerates the goldens that row reaches. The text output names each row below the level and counts the
others, listed in --json; it does not print every row's level.
Note, 2026-11-06 (R2): the mutation fact of decision 2
With ADR-0120's R2, attested reads the mutation of the cited lines (src/lib/mutation-targets.ts,
docs/spec/runward-run.md §7). A row that cites a code location and a test is below attested when its
cited tests kill no mutant of its cited lines through a failed assertion, as decision 2 writes it; held to
« at least one mutant killed » where no failure carries the distinction; reaching attested without the
fact where runward-run has no mutator for the language. One reading this record did not spell out, made
here: a row whose cited lines hold no operator the mutator changes (a port's interface, a type) kills no
mutant of them, so it is below attested, read as written: neither exception applies, and such a row
cites the lines that implement what it claims. Two rows of the shipped example cite an interface that
way; the laboratory of ADR-0120's tests also cites the adapter that implements each, the example does
not yet.
Note, 2026-11-06: two readings of the notes above, decided under the delegation of 2026-11-05
Taken under the maintainer's delegation of 2026-11-05 ("carry it out each time instead of asking me"), on the recommendation of the agent session that built the lock, R2 and R3, and recorded by the session that merged them into the third integration train; the maintainer did not review them before they were written, and each stands until he reverses it.
- A row whose cited lines hold no mutant, a port's interface or a type, stays below
attested. The reading of the R2 note holds as decided: neither exception of decision 2 applies to such a row, and it is kept because it closes the sabotage on those lines. Were it lifted, a row could reachattestedby citing lines no mutant can reach, whatever its cited tests assert. The row reachesattestedby also citing the lines that implement the interface, as the laboratory of ADR-0120's tests does. NEW_MISSION_REQUIRED_LEVELmoves tore-derivedonly in the release that publishes the classification of ADR-0117's criterion 2 at zero false reds, and that release also types the shipped example's prose row (topology-usage-registry-present), with the other work the note on decisions 4 and 6 lists. Until that release,initwrites no level.
Note, 2026-11-06: the condition of decision 4 met at 51675dc, and what the move waits on
ADR-0117's criterion 2 holds at 51675dc: the measurement of the analyzers on three repositories runward
did not write, published with its commands and with the
classification of every finding by reviewer sessions that did not write the analyzers, reads zero false reds
on express, fastify and hono, and the head of the third integration train reads the same 227 ids. The
condition this decision sets on the default of new missions is met.
NEW_MISSION_REQUIRED_LEVEL does not move in that train. Measured on its tree with the constant set to
re-derived: a new mission that follows the blank template is refused, exit 5, on
topology-usage-registry-present. The rule keeps the usage registry in execution-topology.md and the
template puts it there, so the row's one pointer is at the manifest itself, which the gate does not open as
evidence: the row is declared, below re-derived, and the audit corpus's honest case AC-015, a
documentary rule citing the section that states the fact, reads exit 5 where it is accepted today. The move
is made with the coherence of that rule and the template, in the pull request that follows the third
integration train, so the release that publishes the classification carries both. Decided under the
maintainer's delegation of 2026-11-05, on the recommendation of the session that measured it; the
maintainer did not review it before it was written.
Note, 2026-11-06: the default of new missions moved, with the usage registry in a file of its own
NEW_MISSION_REQUIRED_LEVEL is re-derived: runward init writes "requiredLevel": "re-derived" in a new
mission's lock, as the note above on two readings decided, ADR-0117's criterion 2 being published at zero
false reds. What the note above found in the way is gone. topology-usage-registry-present now says the
registry lives in a file of its own, runward/governance/usage-registry.md, cited by deployment from the
row, and execution-topology.md points at it; the blank template ships that file (a seventeenth mission
template), so a new mission that follows it cites a file the gate opens, and the row is re-derived.
templates/rule-history.json gains the rule's new text and loses none. The shipped example cites its
registry in that file, so init --example meets the level it asks for, 24 applied rows re-derived and none
declared, and the goldens it reaches are regenerated; the goldens of runward's own mission keep their bytes.
The audit corpus's honest case AC-015 cites the section of the registry's own file and is accepted; no
refusal case is added, since the corpus holds vectors once found and closed, and the one reading this move
needs in the other direction, a pointer at the manifest itself read declared below the level, is held by
test/unit/levels-lock.test.js and test/unit/run-binding.test.js. The metamorphic relations MR-1, MR-2,
MR-3 and MR-5 compare the whole judgement but levels.execution.expected, the inventory a run Statement is
bound to (ADR-0120 decision 4), which lists the files by path and digests the manifests' bytes, the bytes
those relations change.
runward's own mission does not take the level: it pins no analysis policy, so its territory is not
analysed, and its lock is a pre-merge path. Measured at the head of the pull request that moves the
default, check --strict --require re-derived on it exits 5 with 20 applied rows re-derived and 1 declared,
its usage registry row, which still cites its own manifest. Decided under the maintainer's delegation of
2026-11-05; the lock of runward's mission and its copy of the rule change in the same pull request, a
pre-merge path the maintainer approves.
References
- ADR-0046, ADR-0047, ADR-0055, ADR-0060, ADR-0069, ADR-0073, ADR-0075, ADR-0080, ADR-0083, ADR-0089, ADR-0090, ADR-0093, ADR-0095, ADR-0098.
src/lib/verdict.ts,src/lib/check-contract.ts,src/lib/attestation.ts,docs/spec/runward-signing.md§3,runward/scaffold-lock.json.- Jest's
--passWithNoTestsand pytest's exit code 5, the prior art ADR-0060 and ADR-0114 cite.